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ABSTRACT 
 
HAILEY WALLEY: Two Arguments for Extending Legal Personhood to Nature 
 
This thesis will articulate new sorts of arguments under a legal philosophy framework that I 
believe can be used to protect the environment, but which also have a chance at convincing a 
wide range of citizens and politicians.  The conclusion for which I will argue is that the United 
States should extend legal personhood to Nature. I will first provide detailed analyses of two 
countries that have already extended rights to nature, Ecuador and Bolivia. I will then proceed to 
compare the two cases and discuss what aspects of their models can and cannot be applied to the 
United States, and why. I	will	then	lay	the	groundwork	for	my	first	argument	by	reviewing	how	
legal	personhood	is	currently	treated	in	American	law,	and	then	demonstrate	how	the	reasons	
used	to	justify	extending	legal	personhood	to	other	non-traditional	entities	apply	to	Nature.	
Finally,	my	second	main	argument	is	grounded	on	the	premise	that	autonomy	has	great	value:	
we	need	to	extend	legal	personhood	to	the	environment	to	protect	individual	U.S.	citizens.	The	
purpose	of	these	arguments	is	to	show	how	the	environmentalist	and	libertarian	parties	can	
form	a	coalition	to	protect	Nature,	albeit	for	different	underlying	reasons.	By	doing	so,	I	believe	
it	will		increase	the	chances	for	success	in	granting	Nature	rights	and	ensuring	Her	protection.	  
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Introduction  
 As is evidenced by climate change and its noticeable effects, the Earth is currently dying 
at an unprecedented rate that humanity can no longer ignore. In the last decade, the world’s 
atmospheric carbon dioxide levels have increased by 23 parts per million, the average global 
temperature has increased by 3.2 degrees Fahrenheit, and the sea levels have risen by 43 
millimeters. These numbers do not mean anything out of context, though, so let us take this into 
consideration: the highest recorded carbon dioxide levels on Earth prior to 1950 were never 
above 300 parts per million, and we are now reaching 410 part per million this year; we have not 
seen a decline in average global temperatures since 1910; and sea levels have risen by nearly 
250 millimeters since 1870. This goes to show the dire situation humanity faces in light of our 
unsustainable actions, and it calls for proactive measures to be taken to prevent further damage.  
 However, announcing that something needs to be done is different from convincing 
citizens and politicians that action is necessary.  Although there are numerous credible sources 
that recommend action, climate change continues to be questioned and/or refuted as a way to 
justify our capitalistic tendencies that often utilize unsustainable methods in the name of 
efficiency.  Moreover, even those who are sympathetic may see no clear way forward, and may 
resign themselves to believing that there is no way to change the minds of doubters and skeptics. 
 My thesis will articulate new sorts of arguments under a legal philosophy framework that 
I believe can be used to protect the environment, but that also have a chance at convincing a 
wide range of citizens and politicians.  The conclusion for which I will argue is that the United 
States should extend legal personhood to Nature.  If such personhood were extended, the 
environment would be far better protected and healthy.  The arguments for this conclusion, 
however, will not be based on extremely controversial premises or ideas that will strike 
Americans as strange. On the contrary, my arguments will be largely be based in concepts that 
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are already widely recognized and accepted in American law and tradition: namely, that the 
disabled and corporations are treated as legal persons, and that individual autonomy has great 
value.  Someone who is not an environmentalist could accept the arguments I have developed in 
my thesis.  In fact, someone who is a proponent of libertarianism could accept my arguments. 
 I believe that by taking this legal approach the environmental movement can diversify its 
platform in order to gain wider support which will encourage the implementation of 
environmental protection statutes.  
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Part I: Historical Examples of Extending Personhood to Nature 
 Some may think that we do not need to make new arguments to defend the idea that the 
environment deserves the status of a legal person. After all, countries like Ecuador and Bolivia 
have already given the environment this status, and we might assume that America can simply 
follow their example.  In this first part of my thesis, I’ll argue that such an approach won’t work. 
Although we may wish to copy certain specific aspects of their approach, the model used in 
Ecuador and Bolivia cannot be directly applied in the U.S.  If the U.S. is to grant the 
environment the status of a legal person, a different approach will be needed than the one 
pursued by these countries. 
 In this section, I will first provide detailed analyses of two countries that have already 
extended rights to nature, Ecuador and Bolivia. I will then proceed to compare the two cases and 
discuss what aspects of their models can and cannot be applied to the United States, and why. 
This, then, will set up my argument in the following sections as to how I believe America will 
need to approach extending rights to Nature in order for it to be successful. 	
I.1	Case	Studies:	Ecuador	and	Bolivia	
	 Two Latin American countries have already instated such rights to nature, namely 
Ecuador and Bolivia. In these countries, the Rights of Nature function as both a religious 
principle of inclusion and as a weapon against the State. Both elements were covered under the 
rubric of overall political reform - ‘ethnodevelopment. 
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I.1.a Case Study: Ecuador  
 Ecuador has a presidential republic with a representative democracy, and is considered a 
plurinational polity; seven percent of its population is of indigenous heritage and another seventy 
percent is of mixed indigenous and European heritage, known as Mestizos.1  
 In 2008, Ecuador’s president, Rafael Correa, proposed a redrafting of the Ecuadorian 
constitution to grant rights to Pachamama. The Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of 
Ecuador (CONAIE) was largely responsible for Correa’s election and the establishment of the 
new law and constitution. The redrafted Constitution made these provisions in Chapter 7, now 
known as the Rights of Nature:  
Article 71: Nature or Pachamama, where life is reproduced and exists, has the right to exist, 
persist, maintain and regenerate its vital cycles, structure, functions and its processes in evolution. 
Every person, people, community or nationality, will be able to demand the recognition of rights 
for nature before the public. The application and interpretation of these rights will follow the 
related principles established in the Constitution. 
The State will motivate natural and juridical persons as well as collectives to protect nature; it will 
promote respect towards all the elements that form an ecosystem. 
Article 72: Nature has the right to restoration. This integral restoration is independent of the 
obligation on natural and juridical persons or the State to indemnify the people and the collectives 
that depend on the natural systems. 
In the case of severe or permanent environmental impact, including the ones caused by the 
exploitation of non renewable natural resources, the State will establish the most efficient 
mechanisms for the restoration, and will adopt adequate measures to eliminate or mitigate the 
harmful environmental consequences. 
Article 73: The State will apply precaution and restriction measures in all the activities that can 
lead to the extinction of species, the destruction of the ecosystems or the permanent alteration of 
the natural cycles. 
                                                
1 "Ecuador Population 2019." Ecuador Population 2019 (Demographics, Maps, Graphs). Accessed March 18, 2019. 
http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/ecuador-population/. 
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The introduction of organisms and organic and inorganic material that can alter in a definitive way 
the national genetic patrimony is prohibited. 
Article 74: The persons, people, communities and nationalities will have the right to benefit from 
the environment and form natural wealth that will allow wellbeing. 
If the environmental services cannot be appropriated, its production, provision, use, and 
exploitation will be regulated by the State.2 
The people of Ecuador voted on this, and nearly two-thirds of the populace voted in the 
affirmative, therein resulting in its establishment. In this document, we can see legal rights being 
explicitly extended to Mother Nature. For example, Article 71 states Her right to exist and 
flourish, and it provides her legal representation by the populace to enforce this right.  
 However, though the law may have its intellectual origin in ideas promoted by CONAIE, 
there were other important political influences at play. In fact, in some ways it seems that the 
indigenous ideology espoused by CONAIE was deployed more as as a lobbying effort than 
serving as the actual cause of its establishment. I believe there were at least three other groups 
that helped cause the establishment of this new law. 
 First, the primary political force at work was the 2006 Alianza Pais government plan 
termed “revolucion ciudana” - citizen revolution - that was based on the Quechwa (indigenous 
group) principles of “sumak kawsay,” or “living well.” These principles refer to “a development 
regime based on well-being as opposed to neoliberal economic growth.”3 When a group of 
unsolicited citizens proposed the incorporation of rights for animals and nature to the 
Constitutional Assembly, the Pais government took hold of this idea as a pretext for the radical 
transformation of the new government. Alberto Acosta, an economist, academic, politician, and 
environmental activist who served as the Energy Minister and president of the Constitutional 
Assembly during its redrafting, argued for the establishment of nature’s rights from the 
                                                
2 "Rights of Nature Articles in Ecuador’s Constitution." The Rights of Nature. https://therightsofnature.org/wp-
content/uploads/pdfs/Rights-for-Nature-Articles-in-Ecuadors-Constitution.pdf. 
3 Akchurin, Maria. "Constructing the Rights of Nature: Constitutional Reform, Mobilization, and Environmental 
Protection in Ecuador." Journal of the American Bar Foundation: Law and Social Inquiry 40, no. 4 (2015): 954. 
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perspective of environmental justice by pointing out that the expansion of rights has always been 
thought of as unthinkable until it is done - e.g. women’s rights. He argued that it was time to 
recognize that the environment “has values that are inherent and independent of human use,” and 
that “Guaranteeing a healthy and ecologically balanced environment goes hand in hand with 
cultural strengthening, and that is a genuine human right that is weaved together with the right to 
life, health, work, dignity, and identity.”4 Acosta, then, like other members of the Pais 
government, approached this from the perspective that while the environment is an independent 
entity deserving of rights, it also serves as vehicle for expanding humans rights and protections.  
 Also greatly responsible for this law’s establishment were the environmental social 
movements that did much of the “groundwork for elevating the environmental agenda at the 
national level during the prior decades.”5 These environmental movements were spurred after 
the rediscovery of oil in the Ecuadorian Amazon basin in 1967, where a refinery was established 
and the Trans-Ecuador oil pipeline system was created.6 This pipeline system created conflict 
between the State and the people who ascribed to indigenous ideology. Those in the 
environmental social movement were worried that, in this conflict, land and resources were 
being viewed as commodities to be exploited rather than as making up an interconnected force 
that binds all of reality. There were also other environmental lawyers, along with activists and 
governmental officials, who had previously been looking into this concept in response to the 
continued patterns of environmental degradation in the country. 
 The third major group that pushed for the change in law was not, in fact, too concerned 
with the Rights of Nature as such. Rather, this group was motivated by the idea that Rights of 
Nature could function as a weapon against the State - the State that was exercising unfair power 
                                                
4 Tanasescu, Mihnea. "The Rights of Nature in Ecuador: The Making of an Idea." International Journal of 
Environmental Studies 70, no. 6 (2013): 849. 
5 Akchurin, 939.  
6 Ibid, 945. 
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over its people. For example, this group was very troubled by Article 408 that clearly states that 
“all natural resources are the property of the state.”7 Such an article claims that the state has the 
power to exploit the region’s natural resources without any approval or say of the people. The 
indigenous peoples, in particular, were hurt by this due to the clear difference in moral principles 
between them as naturalists and the State. The State was only focused on profit and 
industrialization, which is one of the reasons this issue came to be addressed during the 
constitutional redraft. So, this fight was not only about the environment. This group was also 
fighting for overall political reform that would “prioritize food sovereignty over exports, the use 
of traditional agricultural practices as opposed to methods relying on heavy use of monocultures 
and pesticides, and valuing biodiversity.”8 In other words, many of the indigenous proponents 
were fighting not only for Pachamama, but also for themselves as marginalized peoples.  
 In conclusion, then, the extension of legal rights to the environment in Ecuador is not a 
simple story of promoting environmentalism. Many groups had many different motivations for 
this action. Moreover, it must be said that since the law was passed, there have been continuing 
challenges in Ecuador: the government still favors export industries that bring in revenue, and it 
never did suspend oil drilling in the Yasuni National Park. Nevertheless, the people of Ecuador 
continue to use the power this law did grant to them. They have filed suit in Her name, such as 
the cases involving “the Nilcambamba River in Loja province, another involving the Blanco 
River in Pichincha province, environmental damage connected to a mining concession in 
Mirador in El Pangui, Zamora, and another connected to road infrastructure expansion in Santa 
Cruz in the Galapagos.”9 
I.1.b Case Study: Bolivia 
                                                
7 Tanaesescu, 850. 
8 Akchurin, 955. 
9 Ibid, 961.  
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 Another	country	to	have	granted	rights	to	Pachamama,	or	Mother	Nature,	is	a	
neighboring	Andean	nation,	Bolivia.	In	1952,	the	lowland	indigenous	peoples	were	excluded	
from	the	agrarian	reform,	which	classified	them	as	‘savages.’	In	response,	a	global	indigenous	
rights	movement	slowly	emerged	in	Bolivia,	and	in	the	1970s	it	sought	“to	challenge	the	until	
then	dominant	‘assimilationist’	approach	to	indigenous	development”	in	order	to	preserve	
fragile	or	valuable	environments	from	destruction.10	The	indigenous	rights	advocates	were	
lobbying	for	alternative	models	of	development	that	would	allow	indigenous	peoples	to	
develop	in	a	way	that	was	appropriate	for	their	culture.	This	lobbying	effort	brought	about	a	
paradigmatic	shift	in	Bolivia	towards	‘ethnodevelopment,’	or	‘development	with	identity.”11	In	
fact,	in	the	1980s	and	1990s,	when	the	World	Bank	began	promoting	and	financing	the	
collective	titling	of	indigenous	territories	in	numerous	countries	in	order	to	protect	the	rights	of	
‘tribal-people’	from	being	harmed	by	developmental	projects,	this	World	Bank	effort	was	able	
to	build	upon	the	new	‘ethnodevelopment’	plan	introduced	in	the	previous	decade.		
	 In	Bolivia,	we	thus	see	that	the	shift	towards	ethnodevelopment	was	largely	based	on	
the	idea	that	indigenous	people	have	a	role	in	biodiversity	conservation	once	they	are	provided	
with	secure	land	rights.	The	idea	that	cultural	diversity	and	biodiversity	are	closely	linked	is	
what	spurred	this	shift;	“our	knowledge	of	biodiversity	rests	in	cultural	diversity,	and	
conserving	biodiversity	helps	strengthen	cultural	integrity	and	values,”	and	the	indigenous	
peoples	were	the	ones	with	the	greatest	knowledge	regarding	biodiversity	in	their	region,	
which	made	them	vital	to	its	protection.12	This	is	how	indigenous	people	came	to	be	known	as	
‘guardians	of	nature.’		
                                                
10 Anthias, Penelope, and Sarah A. Radcliffe. "The Ethno-environmental Fix and Its Limits: Indigenous Land Titling 
and the Production of Not-quite-neoliberal Natures in Bolivia." Geoforum 64 (2015): 259. 
11 Ibid, 259. 
12 Ibid, 260. 
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	 This	shift	in	perception	regarding	the	indigenous	was	very	different	from	the	past.	They	
had	previously	been	classified	as	‘savages’	in	Bolivia’s	1952	Agrarian	Reform	Law,	which	
excluded	them	and	led	to	exploitative	labor	practices	in	their	territories.	In	response	to	the	
world-wide	attention	on	the	nation	and	its	indigenous	community	that	resulted	from	the	World	
Bank	titling	initiatives,	Bolivia	flipped	its	stance	by	recognizing	indigenous	territorial	claims	in	its	
1996	Agrarian	Reform	Law	under	a	new	legal	category	of	Original	Communal	Lands	(Tierras	
Communitarias	de	Origen).	This	reform	enabled	indigenous	groups	to	“formalize	their	land	
rights	and	thus	to	be	able	to	exclude	land	colonization	and	resource	extraction	from	their	
territory;”	however,	subsoil	resources	were	not	included	and	the	lands	titled	to	them	were	
often	the	least	productive.13	This	acts	as	an	example	of	how	these	laws	are	meant	to	function	in	
liberal	law:	Bolivia’s	government	only	changed	its	stance	once	the	world	took	interest	in	their	
indigenous	peoples’	rights,	and	even	then,	the	changes	they	made	were	undermined	by	
exploitative	clauses	that	bolstered	federal	power.		
	 As	was	the	case	in	Ecuador,	it	is	clear	that	the	basis	of	this	movement	wasn’t	simply	to	
protect	biodiversity	and	the	environment.	Rather,	one	of	the	main	motivations	was	to	protect	
the	people	affected	by	her	destruction,	especially	the	indigenous	who	have	dual	interests	in	the	
form	of	religious	protection	and	economic	security.	In	other	words,	these	laws,	when	upheld,	
are	valuable	only	inasmuch	as	they	serve	as	an	instrument	for	self-preservation.	 
I.1.c Comparing the Cases of Ecuador and Bolivia  
 Before asking whether the United States could follow the model of Ecuador or Bolivia in 
extending legal rights to the environment, we should pause and articulate the major components 
of their approach. I believe there are two main elements in both case studies. First, both of these 
                                                
13 Ibid, 262. 
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nations have predominant	indigenous	populations	that	continue	to	adhere	to	their	indigenous	
religious	beliefs,	which	revolve	around	the	Andean	goddess	Pachamama	who	parallels	our	
conception	of	Mother	Earth.	Latin	America	was	converted	to	Christianity,	specifically	
Catholicism,	during	the	Spanish	Conquest,	but	the	indigenous	peoples	found	a	way	to	retain	
their	religious	ideology	by	melding	the	two	religions	into	one,	which	is	still	how	it	functions	
today.	Mother	Mary,	for	instance,	became	the	new	representation	of	Pachamama,	as	
demonstrated	in	the	Andean	Renaissance	paintings	of	her	depicted	as	a	mountain.		
	 When	the	Rights	of	Nature	were	included	in	the	Bolivian	Constitution	in	2008,	the	
Bolivian	government	still	formally	aligned	itself	with	the	Catholic	Church;	a	year	later	they	
became	a	secular	state	as	a	way	to	promote	religious	freedom	and	inclusion,	yet	they	retained	
the	recognition	of	Pachamama	within	the	Rights	of	Nature.	Ecuador,	too,	is	a	secular	state,	yet	
it	also	utilized	indigenous	religious	language	by	referencing	Pachamama	within	its	Rights	of	
Nature	clause.	In	both	cases,	then,	we	see	that	the	establishment	of	legal	personhood	in	these	
countries	was	highly	influenced	by	this	religious	orientation	toward	nature	that	persists	within	
this	region.		
	 The	other	main	common	element	in	both	of	these	case	studies	is	that	the	motivation	for	
extending	rights	to	the	environment	wasn’t	simply	for	the	sake	of	environmental	protection,	
but	rather	to	protect	the	people	affected	by	Her	destruction.	We	have	found	that	this	is	
especially	true	for	the	indigenous	peoples	who	have	dual	interests	in	the	form	of	religious	
protection	and	economic	security.	In	both	Bolivia	and	Ecuador,	the	indigenous	peoples	were	
hurt	by	the	exploitation	of	natural	resources	by	the	government.	In	both	cases,	the	State	was	
focused	on	profit	and	industrialization	at	the	expense	of	the	indigenous	people,	and	in	both	
cases	these	people	were	looking	for	a	way	to	exercise	their	power	as	citizens.	In	fact,	that	is	
why	this	issue	came	to	be	addressed	during	the	constitutional	redrafts.	Moreover,	the	
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indigenous	groups	who	were	most	commonly	affected	were	the	agricultural	workers,	and	thus	
the	exploitation	of	the	environment	by	the	government	and	large	corporations	threatened	
their	economic	livelihood.		
	 In	these	ways,	many	of	the	indigenous	proponents	were	fighting	not	only	for	
Pachamama,	but	also	for	themselves	as	marginalized	peoples.	These	laws	were	not	attempts	to	
prioritize	nature	over	people,	but	rather	legal	tactics	to	protect	the	humans	who	were	also	part	
of	nature.	
I.2	Application	of	the	Ecuadorian	and	Bolivian	Cases	to	the	United	States		
	 We	have	found	that	the	model	used	in	Bolivia	and	Ecuador	to	extend	legal	rights	to	
Mother	Nature	had	two	parts:	first,	building	on	indigenous	religious	beliefs;	second,	using	
environmental	rights	to	protect	vulnerable	citizens.		Could	this	same	two-part	model	be	used	in	
the	United	States?		I	doubt	that	it	could	be	used	effectively	for	two	reasons.	
	 First,	it	is	difficult	to	see	how	indigenous	religious	beliefs	could	find	traction	in	a	secular	
nation	like	America.	The	U.S.	would	not	be	able	to	approach	such	a	shift	towards	eutierrianism,	
or	becoming	one	with	nature,	in	the	same	fashion.	The	U.S.	is	an	inherently	secular	nation;	the	
First	Amendment	of	its	Constitution	delineates	a	separation	of	church	and	state	and	makes	it	
illegal	to	impede	on	the	religious	rights	of	its	citizens.	
	 In	fact,	it is quite telling that studies documenting environmental activism in the United 
States have shown that they tend to steer away from any religious grounding. Take, for example, 
Kauffman and Martin’s study of environmental cases from the United States, New Zealand, and 
Ecuador.14 Their study was extremely thorough and they documented many different aspects of 
                                                
14 Kauffman, Craig, Pamela Martin. “ Comparing Rights of Nature Laws in the U.S., Ecuador, and New Zealand:  
Evolving Strategies in the Battle Between Environmental Protection and “Development.” Paper presented at the 
International Studies Association Annual Conference, Baltimore, MD, February 2017, 1-45.  
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the environmental movement in these different countries. They examine how people in all three 
countries define nature, who speaks for nature, the rights granted to nature, the hierarchy of the 
rights in regard to the legal system overall, its inclusion of precautionary principles, its 
supportive secondary laws, its legal standing, and its recognition by the courts. Kauffman and 
Martin found that the laws of both New Zealand and Ecuador were highly influenced by 
indigenous beliefs that consider even non-living aspects of nature as possessing metaphysical 
characteristics that make them deserving of moral consideration. However, even though their 
account was extremely detailed and exhaustive, they uncovered no evidence that ecosystems in 
United States ordinances are framed as living, spiritual beings. On the contrary, they are 
conceptualized as “natural communities” whose welfare is necessary for the well-being of 
human communities.  
 It	is	also	important	to	mention	that	America	is	much	more	diverse	and	pluralistic	than	
these	Latin	American	nations.	This	is	evidenced	by	the	partitioning	of	its	land	into	fifty	states,	
many	of	which	are	comparable	in	size	to	all	of	Ecuador	and/or	Bolivia.	Also	there	is	the	fact	that	
America	is	composed	of	immigrants	from	all	reaches	of	life.	For	this	reason,	America	does	not	
hold	as	singular	an	identity	as	these	Latin	American	countries;	it	incorporates	foreign	customs	
in	varying	degrees	according	to	each	individual.	Thus,	the	land	size	and	demographics	of	
America	differ	greatly	from	those	of	both	Ecuador	and	Bolivia,	and	this	is	one	reason	why	their	
models	cannot	be	directly	applied	to	the	United	States.	
	 Second,	I	believe	that	there are good reasons to think that the model used by Ecuador and 
Bolivia has not been entirely successful.  Studies have found that these laws’ basis in religious 
ideology actually weakens their authority because they primarily function in liberal law as a way 
to project an idealistic image to the rest of the world rather than being taken seriously by the 
respective governments. In proving this claim there is the example of Ecuador not having 
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suspended the drilling of oil in the Yasuni National Park, even though this contradicts their 
Rights of Nature laws.  
 I believe it is clear, then, that the first component of the Bolivia/Ecuador model should 
not be used in the United States.  But what about the second component – the notion that 
extending rights to the Environment could be used as a tactic for protecting citizens?  Though 
Bolivia’s and Ecuador’s Rights of Nature are both grounded in indigenous religious beliefs with 
the intent of protecting Pachamama, the basis of these movements was also meant to protect the 
people affected by Her destruction. In both countries, indigenous people used the Rights of 
Nature as a weapon against the State that was exploiting their natural resources, treating them as 
inferior, and causing economic insecurity. 
 Interestingly, Kauffman and Martin found that a similar approach was taken in the U.S. 
communities that he analyzed. They found that nature’s rights were often linked to the concept 
of community rights as a tool for protecting themselves against the vagaries of corporate 
property rights. While it was never clear how seriously environmental advocates took the idea 
that Nature itself was supposed to be protected as a legal person, they repeatedly extended 
Mother Nature legal personhood as a mechanism for protecting the people.  This is a common 
theme that seems to have mobilized this movement. 
I.3 Conclusion  
 Based on the historical examples of Bolivia and Ecuador, what sort of approach should 
environmentalists use to extend legal personhood to the environment in the United States? 
 First, it is interesting that the environmental changes in both of these countries built 
upon preexisting beliefs.  As we’ve seen, in Bolivia and Ecuador, these preexisting beliefs 
were religious in nature, and I’ve argued that we cannot hope to find such religious beliefs in 
the United States. That said, I do believe that environmentalists can successfully find different 
kinds of pre-existing beliefs which they could build upon to extend personhood to Nature.  As I 
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will argue in Parts II and III of my thesis, environmentalists in the United States should turn to 
widely-held beliefs in the legal world about corporate personhood.  I’ll argue that arguments 
for extending legal personhood to corporations can be copied and built upon to extend legal 
personhood to Mother Nature. 
 Second, I think the model of Bolivia and Ecuador is helpful in showing that people will 
readily accept extending rights to Nature if it can be shown that such rights can be used as a 
tactic of self-protection.  In part IV of my thesis, I’ll argue for a version of this sort of 
argument that I believe would work well in the United States. I will argue that legal 
personhood could be extended to Mother Nature as a tactic for protecting the deeply-
entrenched value of personal autonomy. 
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Part II: The Current Status of U.S. Legal Personhood  
 To find a more successful approach for extending personhood to nature, I think we 
should turn to current American law and core philosophical principles.  An argument that 
incorporates current American norms and legal precedents has a better chance of being 
persuasive than one incorporating the norms and precedents of South America. In	this	part	of	my	
thesis,	I	lay	the	groundwork	for	that	argument	by	reviewing	how	legal	personhood	is	currently	
treated	in	American	law.	In	the	next	section,	I	will	show	how	this	American	notion	of	legal	
personhood	can	be	extended	to	nature.		
II.1	Description	of	Metaphysical	Personhood	vs.	Legal	Personhood	
	 We should begin by clarifying what is meant by ‘legal personhood’; it should not be 
confused with ‘metaphysical personhood’. Metaphysical	personhood	refers	to	“a	basic	category	
of	reality	encompassing	beings	of	a	certain	type:	rational,	moral	agents,	language	using,	etc.”15	
Legal	personhood,	by	contrast,	“is	any	human	or	non-human	entity	that	is	recognized	as	having	
privileges	and	obligations,	such	as	having	the	ability	to	enter	into	contracts,	to	sue,	and	to	be	
sued;”	it	“often	recognizes	that	certain	groups	of	individuals	can	be	considered	as	a	unit,	an	
actor,	a	legal	person.”16,17	Because	these	are	very	different,	legal	person	status	can	be	extended	
                                                
15 "Concept of Personhood." University of Missouri School of Medicine. Accessed February 14, 2019. 
https://medicine.missouri.edu/centers-institutes-labs/health-ethics/faq/personhood. 
16 Kornhauser, Lewis, and W. Bentley Macleod. "Contracts between Legal Persons." National Bureau of Economic 
Research, 2010, 1. 
17 “Concept of Personhood.” 
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to	artificial	persons,	such	as	corporations,	unlike	with	the	metaphysical	denotation	that	is	
grounded	in	“objective”	aspects	of	reality.18	
	 Almost	all	U.S.	citizens	fall	under	both	categories	of	personhood,	but	there	are	instances	
where	this	is	not	necessarily	the	case.	For	example,	consider	cognitively	disabled	persons.	
While	these	citizens	sometimes	do	not	possess	the	necessary	attributes	to	be	considered	
metaphysical	persons,	the	law	bolsters	their	rights	as	legal	persons	in	order	to	protect	their	
rights	as	citizens	and	humans	to	the	greatest	extent	possible.	This	solidifies	their	presence	as	
moral	agents	within	society.	Then	there	are	those	instances	where	non-human	entities,	like	
corporations,	which	are	not	metaphysical	persons	in	any	sense,	are	granted	legal	personhood	
under	American	law.		
	 In	both	of	these	cases,	American	law	has	extended	legal	personhood	to	entities	that	do	
not	fulfill	the	metaphysical	requirements	for	personhood.	It	is	important	for	my	argument	that	
we	catalog	the	arguments	used	in	American	law	that	justify	this	extension.	I	will	first	discuss	
disabled	persons	in	regard	to	their	capacity,	or	lack	thereof,	to	be	defined	as	metaphysical	
persons;	and	then	consider	how	these	persons	have	been	granted	legal	personhood	by	way	of	
a	guardian	relationship.	Then,	I	will	move	to	discussing	the	United	States’	granting	of	legal	
personhood	to	corporations,	and	the	ways	in	which	corporations	are	conceived	by	the	law	in	
order	for	them	to	be	deserving	of	such	status.	
II.2 Legal Personhood as Extended to the Cognitively Disabled 
                                                
18 There	is	another	distinction	of	personhood	in	regards	to	morality:	“a	moral	person	is	an	agent	who	is	accountable;	
who	has	both	rights	and	responsibilities”	(Dennett	1981:	176).	This	distinction,	however,	can	arguably	be	
contained	within	both	“metaphysical”	and	“legal”	personhood	considering	that	to	have	privileges	and	obligations	
is	synonymous	with	having	rights	and	responsibilities,	and	to	be	a	moral	agent	is	a	prerequisite	for	being	a	
metaphysical	person. 
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 Disabled persons, and more specifically those that are mentally disabled, are often unable	
to	act	as	rational	or	moral	agents,	and	are	thus	metaphysically	different	from	other	persons.	
That	being	said,	the	U.S.	government	recognizes	the	inherent	human	nature	of	a	disabled	
person	in	the	same	way	a	human	fetus,	at	24	weeks	old,	is	considered	human	even	though	it	
lacks	rationality	or	moral	agency.	
	 The 2006 United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) 
provides a particularly helpful way of understanding the reasons the disabled need the special 
protection of legal personhood. There was “an emerging consensus in international human rights 
discourse on the notion that all human persons, regardless of their decision-making capabilities, 
should enjoy ‘legal capacity’ on an equal basis” to those who do have the ability to voice and 
exercise their rights.19 As advanced by Flynn and Arstein-Kerslake, there are currently three 
ways legal systems inhibit the inclusion and representation of disabled persons: status, outcome, 
and function. The status approach entails an individual being denied legal capacity based on 
their medical/legal status as disabled. Under the outcome approach, the individual’s legal 
capacity is denied or restricted based on “the perception that the individual has made a poor 
decision,” such as having checked themselves out of a psychiatric treatment center that results in 
legal restrictions to prevent them from leaving.20 Lastly, on the functional approach the 
individual is determined by medical authorities to be unable to “use, weigh, and retain 
information in order to make a decision, understand the consequences of the decision, and 
communicate the decision to others.”21 
 It was because the disabled were not able able to participate in the political sphere in 
these three ways that governments initially provided paternalistic protection by the law. This 
                                                
19 Flynn, Eilionoir, and Anna Arstein-Kerslake. "Legislating Personhood: Realising the Right to Support in Exercising 
Legal Capacity." International Journal of Law in Context 10, no. 01 (2014): 82. 
20 Ibid, 86. 
21 Ibid, 86.  
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paternalistic approach to representing disabled persons relies on ‘substituted judgement’ in 
which, in the wake of being classified disabled, their legal capacity is stripped from them and a 
third-party is assigned to make decisions for them based on the objective or perceived ‘best 
interest’ of the disabled person.  
 At the 2006 United Nations meeting, however, it was agreed that there was a fairer 
approach than the paternalistic one. It was decided that disabled persons are better protected by 
way of guardianship rather than strict paternalism. Along these lines, there is a call in moral 
philosophy discourse for a holistic and inclusive notion of personhood that it is premised on the 
“communicative and semantic aspects of human capabilities” rather than on cognition or 
rationality.22 In implementing this holistic concept, a newly proposed approach, the support 
model, entails an impartial guardian providing the necessary support to enable the individual to 
exercise their legal capacity based on their existing strengths rather than focusing on the deficits 
of the individual.  
 The CRPD promoted the extension of legal personhood to the disabled by way of 
guardianship in Provisions 3 through 5 of Article 12 of the Convention: 
3. States’ parties shall take appropriate measures to provide access by persons with disabilities to 
the support they may require in exercising their legal capacity. 
4. States’ parties shall ensure that all measures that relate to the exercise of legal capacity provide 
for appropriate and effective safeguards to prevent abuse in accordance with international human 
rights law…such safeguards shall ensure that measures relating to the exercise of legal capacity 
respect the rights, will, and preferences of the person, are free of conflict of interest and undue 
influence, are proportional and tailored to the person’s circumstances, apply for the shortest time 
possible, and are subject to regular review by a competent independent and impartial authority or 
judicial body. The safeguards shall be proportional to the degree to which such measures affect the 
person’s rights and interests.  
                                                
22 Ibid, 84. 
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5. Subject to the provision of this article, States’ parties shall take all appropriate and effective 
measures to ensure the equal right of persons with disabilities to own or inherit property, to control 
their own financial credit, and shall ensure that persons with disabilities are not arbitrarily 
deprived of their property.23 
As a member of the United Nations, the United States signed this Convention on July 30th of 
2009 without any ratifications or optional protocol action.  
 This support model, then, is a guardianship approach where the disabled are allocated a 
guardian who aids in representing them in legal matters according to their own wishes rather 
than being subjected to paternalistic oversight. This move towards guardianship proves to be 
revolutionary in its recognition of disabled persons as capable of acting as legal and moral 
agents via representation. Though the line between guardianship and paternalism may prove to 
be vague in certain instances when the disabled person in question has very limited capabilities 
of expression or communication, the move towards recognizing their personhood and the actions 
taken to protect this status is nonetheless a significant step toward providing them equal 
opportunities.  
II.3 Legal Personhood as Extended to Corporations 
 An even more dramatic example of non-traditional entities being considered legal 
persons in the United States is the extension of legal person status to artificial beings like 
corporations. Corporations were granted legal person status and rights in 1886 by the United 
States Supreme Court under the argument that corporations had been “delegated responsibility 
for ensuring society’s economic welfare.”24 But as time has gone on, there have been many 
proposed arguments as to why legal personhood should be extended to corporations. Indeed, in 
current American law, there are at least five different ways corporations are conceptualized that 
                                                
23 The United Nations. 2006. “Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.” Treaty Series 2515 (December): 
3. 
24 Johnson, Lyman. “Law and Legal Theory in the History of Corporate Responsibility: Corporate Personhood." Seattle 
University Law Review 35, no. 1135 (2012): 1142. 
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then justify the extension of legal personhood status to them: the concession theory, the 
aggregate theory, the real entity theory, the nexus of contracts theory, and the intelligent 
machine metaphor.25,26  
 The concession theory deems a corporation to be an ‘artificial person’ that depends on the 
law to give it legal personality. Along similar lines, the nexus of contracts theory is an economic 
approach that perceives corporations as entities that gain rights based on contracts drafted by 
individuals that delineate such rights and boundaries. Under these theories, the corporation is 
perceived to be a ‘person’ merely in legal terms as a way to address what rights and 
responsibilities it holds, but it is not in any way believed to resemble or act as a real person. 
These two theories differ primarily in that the concession theory calls for the federal and state 
governments to decide the extent of a corporation’s rights and responsibilities while the nexus of 
contracts approach places this authority in the hands of the shareholders. That is why the nexus 
of contracts theory is an economic approach: it provides protection and power to the owners of 
the company who will utilize such authority to their monetary advantage.  
 The aggregate theory assumes a corporation to be a collection of individuals that yields 
the rights and duties of the persons who compose it. This theory is the first step towards 
attributing human qualities to a corporation in that it recognizes the corporation as an 
overarching representation of those within it. The corporation is viewed as an extension of the 
peoples who compose it, which therein justifies its protection under the law as a legal person.  
 The intelligent machine metaphor theory views corporations as intelligent machines that 
act independently of human action, and exist prior to and after individual members. This can be 
perceived as either the ultimate representation of a corporation acting as a human, or as the least 
anthropomorphic representation of a corporation. On the one hand, it is saying that a corporation 
                                                
25 Pollman, Elizabeth. "Reconceiving Corporate Personhood." Utah Law Review, 2011, 1641-1670.  
26 Ripken, Susanna K. "Corporations Are People Too: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to the Corporate Personhood 
Puzzle." Fordham Journal of Corporate and Financial Law 15, no. 97 (2010): 106-13. 
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is comparable to an artificial intelligence robot that is not human but is nonetheless treated as 
one for the sake of legal means; this is similar to how the concession and nexus of contracts 
theories perceive corporations. However, intelligence is often used as the primary standard for 
distinguishing humans from other living creatures. Thus, it can be argued that the independent 
nature of a corporation’s intelligence, as well as the breadth of the intelligence, would be 
sufficient to consider it a pseudo-super-human.  
 The most widely endorsed approach in American law is the real entity theory, wherein 
the corporation acts as a collective consciousness that results from the discussion and 
compromise among the individual members that compose it, and that exists prior to and separate 
from the State. On this theory, the corporation is perceived to be a ‘real’ person in terms of its 
capacity to act as a moral agent and utilize rational thinking via the collective intent and action 
of its constituents; and since the corporation is functioning as a real individual, it must be held 
responsible as a legal person.  
 It is important to note that the word ‘real’ in this context is not synonymous to ‘natural.’ 
It is not that the corporation is believed to be a natural human being, but rather, the theory 
recognizes that a corporation is actually existing, which is made possible by the collective 
consciousness that constitutes its being. In this sense, like the concession and nexus of contracts 
theories, the real entity theory also views the corporation as an artificial person, with the added 
explicit recognition that it is also real. It also differs from those two theories in that while it may 
recognize the synthetic nature of this real entity, it does not differentiate the corporation from 
humans based on such; it grants corporations rights that are not necessarily guaranteed by the 
contracts that spur their creation. In this regard, the real entity theory believes the differentiation 
between natural and artificial persons to be irrelevant because both are granted inherent and 
inviolable rights that are protected under the Constitution. 
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 Though the	real	entity	theory	has	since	prevailed	in	how	the	U.S.	legal	system	perceives	
corporations	as	persons,	it	should	be	noted	that	even	the	real	entity	theory	is	incomplete	in	
that	“it	fails	to	illuminate	why	the	entity	should	receive	constitutional	protection	as	a	person	
and	what	the	scope	of	that	protection	should	be.”27	For	instance,	corporate	entities	do	not	
receive	all	the	constitutional	powers	accorded	to	natural	persons;	they	lack	the	Fifth	
Amendment	protection	against	self-incrimination,	they	cannot	vote	or	become	citizens,	and,	
under	corporate	statutes,	they	cannot	serve	as	directors	of	corporations,	unlike	individuals.28	
Also, as artificial persons, corporations can have restrictions and sanctions that would never be 
imposed on humans but are done so in these corporate instances because they enhance the 
constitutional rights of humans.29 For instance, the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 was enacted 
in order to restrict corporations from forming monopolies because this may lead to the 
encroachment on a citizen’s right to liberty in that it could force consumer decisions by 
eliminating all competition.  
 Thus, even under this prevailing real-entity theory, the conception of corporations as 
legal persons is vastly different from how we perceive traditional humans as legal persons. 
Though we may consider them artificial persons for the sake of legal terminology, the 
application of legal person status to these non-traditional entities grants them specific rights and 
restrictions that are unique to them in comparison to those granted to U.S. citizens. We may 
arguably assert, then, that rather than fully extending legal person status to include corporations, 
we have actually created a sub-category of legal personhood that contains corporations in the 
same way that disabled persons have been granted a distinctive form of legal person status.  
                                                
27 Pollman, 1663.  
28 Johnson, 1156.  
29 Graver, David. "Personal Bodies: A Corporeal Theory of Corporate Personhood." University of Chicago Law School 
Roundtable 6, no. 1 (1999): 250. 
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 With	a	clear	conception	of	legal	personhood,	and	with	an	overview	of	how	this	has	been	
applied	in	the	U.S.	to	things	that	are	different	from	typical	metaphysical	persons,	I	can	begin	
my	argument	for	extending	legal	personhood	to	nature.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
   24 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Part III: Extending Personhood to Nature: The Argument by Analogy  
 My first argument is an extended argument by analogy: legal personhood is currently 
extended to corporations and the disabled; Nature resembles the disabled and corporations in 
relevant ways; thus, legal personhood should be extended to Nature. In comparing the disabled 
to the environment, I will address the similarities in their incapacities, and then I will discuss 
how the guardianship approach can be applied to the environment. The approach I will take in 
comparing the environment to corporations will entail a demonstration of how the theories used 
to justify the extension of legal personhood to corporations can similarly be applied to the 
environment.  
III.1 The Disabled as Legal Persons —> The Environment as a Legal Person  
 As discussed in section two, cognitively disabled persons are granted a special form of 
legal personhood status in the United States in order to protect their rights as human beings. To 
be specific, the CRPD concluded that disabled individuals should be judged by their strengths 
rather than their weaknesses, and that they are to be provided legal guardians that are meant to 
represent the individuals and their desires to the greatest extent without enacting paternalistic 
oversight.  
 The cognitively disabled, as persons who are unable to express clearly their thoughts and 
desires, closely resemble the environment that is exploited due to its inability to communicate in 
the same way humans do. Thus, if we are willing to grant guardianship and representation to a 
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group of people who technically lack the agency to be considered a metaphysical person, then 
Mother Nature, too, has a basis for being granted similar representation and guardianship.  
 After all, the underlying similarity between the disabled and the environment is not only 
that they cannot use language to express their desires, but the fact that they are both living. 
While there are many things that cannot use language, such as shoes or a lamp, what makes it 
significant in the case of the environment is that it is composed of entities that are organic, living 
beings without the full capacity to express themselves as fully functional humans can. On the 
basis of these similarities, we should grant Nature, as the single entity encompassing these living 
beings, guardianship as a way to acknowledge Her living status and offer Her the opportunity to 
express and protect Herself in the same way we provide such protection to the disabled who also 
lack this capacity.  
 There are different ways of extending legal personhood to the disabled and the 
environment. In both of these instances it is important to differentiate between guardianship and 
paternalism. Paternalism is when a person of authority restricts another’s rights for their 
supposed best interest. Guardianship, on the other hand, considers the wishes of the individual in 
question when making legal decisions for them. This creates a mutual bond between the two 
rather than an authoritarian complex that places the incapacitated at a disadvantage. In 
addressing this concern, I propose that a way to ensure fair guardianship of Mother Nature 
would be for environmental scientists to represent her in legal matters rather than politicians 
who have conflicting interests in economic matters. Just as the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities concluded that assigning just any third-party individual 
was not sufficient for providing the disabled person fair representation, Mother Nature also 
would need representation by persons who are adequately versed in her processes and needs so 
as to ensure she is being provided unbiased aid. Though this is not a fail-safe method, 
considering that even the scientist could be easily persuaded or bribed to make certain decisions, 
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I do feel that the scientist is still more qualified and protected from these vices than politicians 
who are more distanced from the agent in consideration.  
 The question then becomes: how and to what do we grant such guardianship in the case 
of the environment - each animal, every plant, or ecosystems as a single unit? I propose that 
guardianship should be extended to ecosystems as a whole rather than to specific species or 
entities. This belief is grounded in the fact that though the pollution of only one water source or 
the death of one species of fish may be the topic of debate within some legal case, the 
destruction of any one thing in nature will almost always cause detrimental effects on the rest of 
the ecosystem due to the interrelated nature of reality. For instance, the pollution of a river could 
poison and kill a particular species of fish - a species that is the primary food source for some 
species of bird that will now also die due to the lack of available sustenance, and then the foxes 
that depend on those birds for sustenance will lose their food source, as well - and this cycle will 
continue to extend throughout the entire food chain until it has affected each and every tier in 
some way. That being said, the ideal guardian, then, would be one who focuses their studies on 
and has direct experience with the particular ecosystem in question. This is because a specialized 
expert will have a better understanding of the historical and current conditions of the specific 
ecosystem, as well as what would be in its best interest for maintaining an equilibrium for 
sustaining life.  
III.2 The Corporation as a Legal Person —> The Environment as a Legal Person  
 As we saw in the last part of my thesis, there are many different arguments people have 
proposed to justify extending legal personhood to corporations. I believe that when we compare 
the status of corporations (as commonly theorized) to the environment, we find a number of 
similarities.  While it is true that some theories of corporations are more helpful than others, all 
the theories expose avenues by which legal personhood could be extended to Nature for reasons 
similar to those used to extend them to corporations.  
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III.2.a The Concession and Nexus of Contracts Theories  
 First, recall the concession and nexus of contract theories that extend personhood to 
corporations in order to legally enforce their regulation and restriction by adjudging them 
‘artificial persons.’ When considering the environment in the context of the concession and 
nexus of contracts theories that support corporations being granted legal personhood, we might 
argue that there is nothing less artificial about thinking of the environment as an artificial being 
or as a site of contracts than is the case for corporations. As discussed in the previous section, 
the environment is arguably more closely related to metaphysical persons than most things, 
considering its living, organic nature; so, in some ways, it is more feasible to consider the 
environment an artificial person than even a corporation. Thus, the environment, too, could be 
granted legal person status, as an artificial person that is dependent on laws to give it legal 
personality. Nevertheless, considering that the vague nature of this standard thereby permits 
almost anything to be granted such status on this basis, I consider this to be one of the less 
convincing ways to argue that legal personhood extends to Nature.  
III.2.b The Aggregate Theory 
 Next, I turn to the aggregate theory. It justifies the granting of legal personhood to 
corporations by extending the rights of the individuals within it to the corporation itself, thereby 
viewing the corporation as an extension of the individual. Thus, if the basis of the legal 
personhood of corporations lies in the fact that a corporation is a collection of individuals that 
may yield the collection rights and duties based on those of its constituents, then we can argue 
that the environment only further exemplifies this definition, considering that all of humanity, 
life, and even non-living things compose it. The environment is the broadest extension of the 
individual. In fact, I think it is useful to think of the environment along the model of an 
umbrella: a collection of humans compose a corporation, a collection of humans and 
corporations make up a government, and all humans, plus living and non-living things such as 
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the corporations and governments, constitute the environment.  At each stage, we use the 
aggregate theory to grant rights to these larger entities as a way to support the rights of the 
individuals within them; we could extend such status to the environment in the same aggregating 
way we do to the corporations and governments within it.  
 The predominant issue with trying to extend such rights to the environment is that it only 
explicitly supports the rights of humans within the environment as holders of rights themselves, 
whereas the animals and other living entities that do not inherently hold rights are not assumed 
to also receive such protection. Though the environment as a whole would necessarily be 
granted legal personhood, the aggregate theory may only provide protection to humans as those 
who are extending their rights to the environment. The other creatures of nature are left exposed 
still, which contradicts the purpose of the argument. Thus, the weakness of the aggregate theory 
is that some entity only gains rights by extending the rights of humans, and only as a way to 
further protect humans. We, however, are aiming to find protection for all life.  
III.2.c The Real Entity Theory 
 According to the prevailing real entity theory, corporations have legal personhood 
because humans form a collective consciousness that functions as a real entity. I believe that the 
environment not only meets this requirement but extends it, considering that its collective 
consciousness also incorporates that of the living flora and fauna.  
 Some may argue that living entities in nature do not have consciousness, so they are not 
capable of contributing to a collective consciousness. I believe this to be an anthropocentric 
perspective on the matter. As I discussed earlier in the comparison to the disabled, just because 
nature does not communicate in the same way humans do does not mean that it is not conscious 
and communicative in its own unique way. Nature is extremely adaptable, and adaptability is 
one of the primary indicators of consciousness - to be able to discern oneself as independent 
from its surroundings, to recognize changes in one’s surroundings, and then to alter one’s own 
   29 
actions according to such changes. In exemplifying nature’s adaptability, a tree or plant will 
recognize a depletion in its water source or a lack of sunlight and, in turn, actively move its roots 
and self in the direction of resources in order to preserve itself. In terms of nature’s ability to 
communicate and form a collective consciousness that acts as one, there have been many studies 
that prove trees communicate. According to a study done by the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science, “plants may ‘eavesdrop’ on volatile organic compounds (VOCs) 
released by herbivore-attacked neighbors to activate defenses before being attacked 
themselves.”30 In short, by using biological transmitters and signals, plants are able to collect 
and analyze data given off by adjacent organisms in order to enhance their own survival 
techniques. This illustrates how plants communicate with other aspects of nature, and how they 
recognize their individual existence in contrast to their surroundings.  
 Under the real entity theory, there is also the stipulation that a real entity exists 
independently of any one group of individuals composing it. I argue that the environment not 
only does this, but could actually exist and flourish without the existence of any humans, which 
demonstrates its extremely independent nature. Some may then argue that Nature may function 
independently of humans, and that all living things constitute its collective consciousness, but 
that Nature does not have “surroundings” that enable it be considered an independent entity on 
its own accord. This deepens the discussion to consider Earth’s existence in relation to that of 
the whole universe. In discussing Nature as a holistic, independent entity that is constituted by 
all living things on our planet, we are basically speaking of Earth as a whole; and in doing so we 
are discussing Earth in relation to the other entities that compose our solar system. Thus, Nature, 
i.e. Earth, is its own independent, real entity with all of its inhabitants forming its collective 
                                                
30 Baldwin, Ian T. "Volatile Signaling in Plant-Plant Interactions: "Talking Trees" in the Genomics Era." Science 311, 
no. 5762 (2006): 812-15. 
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consciousness. Considering these stipulations, Nature counts as an independent, real entity 
composed of a collective consciousness that is deserving of rights, if based on this theory.  
 Furthering this concept under the real entity theory, I believe we could argue that the 
environment not only functions as a collective consciousness of the life that composes it, but that 
it actually is a real entity. Although this claim might sound a bit outlandish at first, consider a 
familiar example: the government.  A government is treated as an artificial person that functions 
to advance the goals of its populace through its formation of an actual collective consciousness 
that constitutes its moral agency.  It’s because we think of governments as expressing the will or 
mandate of its peoples that we think of it as having agency and having rights. I believe that we 
can think of the environment in the same way. Even more than any corporation or government, 
the environment could be thought of as a real living organism with the world’s water as its 
blood, each continent as its organs, and each living being and thing as its cells. Indeed, the 
environment surpasses a corporation or a government in exemplifying the concept of a real 
entity because it is not only real but also living. 
 In anticipating the objections against this perception of the environment as a real and 
living entity, one may argue that the environment differs from a government because plants and 
animals may not have a common will to express, whereas the government does for its 
constituents. Furthermore, one may even argue that a government does not express an actual 
collective will, considering the corruption and inequality that ensues from its creation. In 
responding to the latter objection, I argue that whether the government actually functions in the 
way it was meant to or not is irrelevant because intent is the authoritative reference in legal 
matters. The intent of creating America’s democratic republic was for the government to act in 
accordance with the will of the people, which is made possible by elected representation. Thus, 
according to the law, the government does hypothetically constitute a collective will of its 
peoples, as that was its original intent.  
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 As for the first objection that flora and fauna do not have a will to contribute to a 
collective will, this also seems to be a fairly anthropocentric perspective to hold. The will of 
each plant and animal is to survive and persist through reproduction over time - a very simple 
but universal goal of all living things. At this point in time, humans now have the ability to hold 
very individualized goals and wills because we have surpassed the need to solely focus on 
securing our survival, since we have achieved dominance over the food chain. Thus, though 
nature’s will to survive may not seem as complex as that of humans, it is nonetheless a collective 
will that is inherent to all living entities, including humans. I argue, then, that the collective will 
expressed by the environment is to survive and secure life on Earth, which is truly the 
foundation of all other wills.  
 With this added insight in how Nature functions as not only a real entity but a real, living 
entity, I believe that the real entity theory accurately applies to Nature, which justifies the 
extension of legal personhood to Her.  
III.2.d The Intelligent Machine Metaphor  
 Finally, consider the intelligent machine metaphor. Under this theory, corporations are 
granted legal personhood because they act as independent, intelligent machines in that they 
function without the intervention of any one group of individuals. Using this approach, we could 
argue that the environment is arguably a natural, intelligent machine since it functions in a 
systematic way with or without the intervention of human action. Furthermore, it not only exists 
prior to and after the individual persons composing it, but it did and could continue to exist 
without the presence of humans altogether. In fact, at this point in time, one could even argue 
that the environment would probably function better without our existence. Does that not 
illustrate its superior status as a machine, considering we could not say the same about our 
relationship with it? Under this theory, humans would be merely cogs in the machine of nature - 
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tools for enhancing the function of the whole - which dismantles many of the anthropocentric 
ideals held by humanity regarding our superiority.  
 In proof of Nature’s superiority, while Nature continues to naturally adapt to the changes 
we cause, humans look to nature when trying to adapt or learn. Humans are constantly 
dependent on Nature for our knowledge and understanding of reality, yet Nature does not look to 
us to learn or adapt. This seems to demonstrate that Nature exemplifies a superior intelligence 
and maturity even to that of humanity. If humans were truly the epitome of intelligence within 
our world, why would we need to rely on the environment to understand our own reality? One 
could argue that neither humanity nor nature inherently understand the functionings of reality, 
but that humanity is superior in that we utilize our perceptions of our surroundings to grasp this 
understanding while nature remains oblivious. However, I feel that Nature obviously does 
understand such inner-workings better than we because it naturally adapts to changes in its 
system without referencing how to do so from other entities. Whether Nature does this 
subconsciously or not, I believe that its inherent understanding of how to reestablish equilibrium 
proves that it understands reality better than we do.  
 Humans consistently use intelligence as a basis for judging other entities and placing 
them in a stratified order, and the environment proves its worth in this distinction through its 
natural adaptivity and independence. Thus, based on these attributes, Nature does exemplify a 
naturally intelligent machine, which justifies the extension of legal rights to it, according to the 
intelligent machine metaphor.  
 
III.2.e Evaluating the Strengths of Each Theory in Applying it to Nature  
  Based on the analyses of these theories in their application to Nature, I propose that the 
real entity theory and the intelligent machine metaphor are the two strongest avenues for 
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supporting the extension of legal personhood to Nature. Not only is the real entity theory the 
prevailing one in how to perceive corporations in U.S. law, making it an ideal theory on which 
base the environmental argument, but it also recognizes the holistic essence of Nature. As I have 
demonstrated, Nature is both real and living, which makes it uniquely qualified to be considered 
worthy of legal personhood, under the real entity theory.  
 As for the intelligent machine metaphor, I believe this to be another strong argument due 
to its philosophical basis in dismantling the anthropocentric perspective of humanity. It proves 
that Nature is intelligent and superior in its own way, which grants it value separate from its 
utilitarian benefit for humanity. One of the most difficult obstacles environmentalists will face in 
trying to extend rights to Nature will be this belief that Nature is simply a tool for humans as 
superior creatures. The intelligent machine metaphor, however, exemplifies why Nature is 
deserving of its own rights based on its natural superiority as the all-encompassing entity that 
constitutes our reality.  
 On the other hand, I believe the concession and nexus of contracts theories to be the 
weakest arguments for extending rights to Nature because of their vague and broad basis. Nearly 
anything could be granted rights under such guidelines. These theories bypass demonstrating 
why some entity should be granted rights and skip straight to how the entity is conceived under 
the law for some intended effect. In short, these are retroactive approaches that merely define the 
limits of a non-traditional rights-bearing entity rather than addressing why the entity in question 
is deserving of such rights in the first place.  
 As for the aggregate theory, I find this to be a subpar approach for the environmental 
movement in comparison to the real entity and intelligent machine metaphor theories because of 
the inherent inequalities of the approach. The aggregate theory is based on the extension of 
human rights to an overarching entity as a way to protect the individuals within it. As such, it 
automatically places all other living organisms at a disadvantage because it is merely a tool for 
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protecting humanity within the system rather than for protecting the system as a whole. While 
the real entity theory discusses the collective in terms of a collective consciousness, which opens 
the door to consider the consciousness of other organisms, the aggregate theory limits its 
interpretation by focusing on the metaphysical state of humans as a collective. Even if one were 
effectively able to utilize this approach in granting Nature legal personhood, it would do nothing 
to change the anthropocentric idea that Nature is solely valued according to its benefit to 
humans, which I believe limits the intended goal to view Nature as its own entity deserving of 
rights and protection.	
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Part IV: Extending Personhood to Nature: The Autonomy Argument 
 My second main argument is grounded on the premise that autonomy has great value: we 
need to extend legal personhood to the environment to protect individual U.S. citizens. 
IV.1 Autonomy: a Core American Principle that American Citizens Will Want to Protect 
 The United States was created in order to escape the tyrannical rule of England’s 
monarchy, and our Constitution is thus grounded in the beliefs of small-government and personal 
autonomy so as to prevent such oppression. Thus, considering the United States’ ideological basis 
in personal autonomy and individual rights, I believe this approach of self-protection from 
corporations and an authoritarian government to be the ideal course of action for ensuring 
nature’s rights in America. It veers away from a speculative argument of what Nature deserves 
towards a more tangible one that focuses on protecting people in terms they can readily 
understand. Though many Americans believe environmental rights to be of the utmost 
importance, such beliefs are grounded in morals or scientific data that are refutable or questioned. 
By contrast, the belief in personal autonomy is usually taken as a bedrock or first principle within 
our shared political framework, which makes it more relatable to most American citizens. Under 
the argument I am offering in this part of my thesis, one need not be an environmentalist to 
support the cause, but merely a proponent of individual rights and someone who accepts the need 
for protections against authoritarian governments and exploitative corporations.  
IV.2 The Difference between American and Latin American Conceptions of Autonomy  
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 When referencing the historical examples of Rights of Nature in Bolivia and Ecuador, 
recall that these nations also placed a focus on citizen protection from the government by 
granting Nature legal personhood and promoting ethnodevelopment. Though the indigenous 
religious beliefs figured into a lobbying effort for the establishment of this law, the underlying 
purpose of the policy itself was to grant citizens protection from natural resource extraction. In 
this way, the citizens of Bolivia and Ecuador were also fighting for personal autonomy and 
protection from governmental and corporate actions.  Thus, at first glance, it might seem that we 
could simply adopt the same argument that was used in these South American countries and 
apply it here in North America. 
But there is a glaring difference in Latin America’s conception of autonomy and that 
found in the United States. The difference lies in our demographic distribution. Most of those 
fighting for autonomous rights in Latin America are comparable to our Native American 
population, who are arguably still oppressed in many ways. In Latin America, the indigenous 
population is a majority of the populace, so their fight for autonomy is more grounded in an anti-
establishment effort with the goal of reinforcing indigenous beliefs and ways of life; these 
citizens are defending a community-based autonomy rather than an individual autonomy. The 
United States, by contrast, celebrates a more individualized concept of autonomy in which each 
person, no matter his or her race, religious beliefs, etc., has the right to live and prosper as he or 
she wishes without constraint (as long as it does not cause harm to others). It emphasizes 
individual protection from entities like corporations, the government, and even communities.  
 If, then, we argue that legal personhood should be extended to Mother Nature because 
doing so will protect citizens’ autonomy, we should stress in an American context that this 
extension will protect individual autonomy by preventing any group from accumulating too much 
power; protecting individual autonomy rights mitigates the possibility of accrued power in an 
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entity that can act in a tyrannical fashion over all others.  This is the sort of premise that will be 
best received and accepted in the United States. 
IV.3 Ways in which Extending Legal Personhood to the Environment would Protect the Autonomy 
of American Citizens 
 The question then becomes, how would granting the environment legal personhood 
actually protect individual autonomy? I think it is most helpful to consider the Dakota Pipeline 
debacle, and similar examples, in which individual citizens were unable to legally protect their 
self-interest in environmental rights or their way of life because they were unable to illustrate 
personal monetary loss by the construction plan. In contemporary U.S. law, the only way to 
litigate against corporate/governmental plans involving the environment is to prove that one will 
be monetarily affected by its construction, or that the construction acts as a substantial nuisance 
to the property one owns. There are many instances, however, in which people, both local and 
non-local, disagree with the building of a corporate plant or some other construction for other 
reasons: because it will mar the natural landscape and ecosystem in general, because they believe 
it to be morally wrong, because it will infringe on their way of life, because they do not agree 
with the ideals of the company, because its construction will cause immense pollution to common 
goods that will affect all future generations, and so on. 
 Under current U.S. law, citizens are not able to fight explicitly against such plans for 
these reasons - they are not seen as substantial enough to be taken into consideration. According 
to the modern standing to sue guidelines, the plaintiff must show that they have suffered an 
“injury in fact,” establish causation in showing that the injury “fairly can be traced back to the 
challenged action,” and show that the injury "is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision" of 
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the court.31 Thus, for a case to hold up in court it must be oriented around proving that the 
plaintiff has suffered direct injury. Even then, though, were the plaintiff to prove injury, there is 
still a consideration of cost-benefit analysis that may award him/her damages but not injunction, 
so the source problem will continue to exist and cause further damage. For instance, in the United 
States case Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Company (1970), the plaintiff was awarded damages for 
the nuisance caused by the Atlantic Cement Company’s pollution, but the court did not award 
injunction because the company’s net-worth was considered too high in comparison to the 
damage they were causing to justify it be closed. As this demonstrates, our society and 
governmental decisions are primarily based on economic consideration in the form of benefit and 
cost analysis, which places the citizen at a disadvantage.  
 However, the concept of personal autonomy does not acknowledge this stipulation that 
decisions must be based on economic consideration. The central meaning of personal autonomy 
is freedom to pursue one’s goals and desires (as long as they do not harm another); there is no 
necessary consideration of personal economic well-being. Thus, by making use of this concept of 
personal autonomy, our citizens would be able to fight for environmental change whether they 
had an economic argument or not. In fact, this autonomy could be either narrowly or more 
broadly conceived, and so be involved in many different kinds of conflicts. By extending 
personhood to the environment, citizens would have another legal avenue they could use to 
thwart environmental damage which didn’t depend on an economic argument. 
IV.4 Existing Examples of Rights of Nature in the United States 
 The argument I am making in this part of my thesis does have some precedent. The first 
steps towards extending rights to Nature in the United States as a way to protect individual 
autonomy have already been taken by five U.S. cities/communities. Craig Kauffman, a Political 
                                                
31 "Substantial Interest: Standing." Legal Information Institute. Accessed April 07, 2019. 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-3/section-2/clause-1/substantial-interest-standing. 
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Science professor at the University of Oregon, and his partner Pamela Martin, analyzed 
Pennsylvania’s Tamaqua Borough, Grant Township, and Highland Township, as well as Santa 
Monica, California, as examples of local communities that have established such rights to Nature. 
In their work, Kauffman and Martin also compare these U.S. attempts to similar ones made in 
Ecuador and New Zealand.  
 Kauffman and Martin claim that the Community Environmental Legal Defense Fund 
(CELDF), “formed in 1995 by environmental lawyers who concluded that existing environmental 
laws were inadequate because they focused on mitigating harms rather than preventing them,”32 
is largely responsible for the actions taken by these U.S. communities. The CELDF began 
helping communities develop Community Bills of Rights that could provide a legal basis for 
residents to defend their interests against corporations invoking property rights to justify 
environmentally destructive behavior.  
 In 2006, with the aid of CELDF, Pennsylvania’s Tamaqua Borough crafted and 
established the first Rights of Nature ordinance in the world. It invokes the community’s right “to 
protect the health, safety, and welfare of the residents of Tamaqua Borough, the soil, 
groundwater, and surface water, the environment and its flora and fauna” in order “to ban 
corporations and other limited liability entities from engaging in the land application of sewage 
sludge.”33 According to Kauffman and Martin, this ordinance is novel because it treats the Rights 
of Nature as a tool for strengthening community rights in relation to corporate property rights: it 
enables the community members to challenge a corporation in court according to the effects the 
corporation is having on the ecosystem, which is easier to prove than negative effects caused on 
individual health.  
                                                
32 Kauffman and Martin, 9.  
33 Ibid, 10.  
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It is interesting to note, however, that while this ordinance granted legal personhood to all 
borough residents, natural communities, and ecosystems, it explicitly denied this recognition to 
corporations as a way to limit their rights to interfere “with the existence and flourishing of 
natural communities or ecosystems.”34 This denial seems to contradict the federal government’s 
extension of such rights to corporations, which is why the ordinance has had difficulty being 
upheld in court.  This limitation is due to its being a mere ordinance; however, this conflict could 
be mitigated were the State to implement Rights of Nature because the State has greater 
authority.  
 Following the establishment of the Global Alliance for the Rights of Nature (GARN) in 
2010, Pittsburgh, PA became the first major U.S. city to recognize the Rights of Nature and ban 
shale gas drilling and fracking as a way to “elevate the rights of people, the community and 
nature over corporate rights.”35 Following this momentum, one of the founders of GARN began 
working with Santa Monica, CA to establish a Sustainability Rights Ordinance. Unlike the 
Tamaqua Borough ordinance, Santa Monica’s was not in response to an immediate threat to the 
community, but was rather an extension to a Santa Monica Sustainable City Plan that was 
established in 1994. In this sense, the Santa Monica case is unique in that it takes a proactive 
approach in ensuring future sustainable development rather than acting retroactively. But this just 
shows that extending rights to nature as a tactic for allowing people to protect their rights has 
some precedent. 
 Finally, in 2013 and 2014, the Highland and Grant townships of Pennsylvania passed 
Community Bill of Rights ordinances. Highland Township was the first to do so, and it was 
spearheaded by Highland’s Water Authority with the help of CELDF in response to the growing 
                                                
34 Ibid, 10.  
35 Ibid, 14. 
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concern that fracking would contaminate the region’s water supply.36 It expanded community 
rights, granted ecosystems in the county the right to exist and flourish, and banned all activities of 
natural gas and fossil fuel extraction and waste water injection. A year later, Grant Township 
followed suit in instating a Community Bill of Rights ordinance in response to Pennsylvania Gas 
and Electric’s filing for a permit to inject waste water into one of the unused wells in the 
township.37 Considering this township relies entirely on private wells and springs for their 
drinking water, the residents became concerned that the injected water waste would leak into 
their drinking-water sources. Thus, they established their own Community Bill of Rights 
ordinance that prohibited depositing oil and gas waste materials in the township.  
 In all of these cases, Kauffman and Martin found that they conceptualize Nature on the 
ecosystem level, rather than individual flora or fauna, and the ecosystems are sets of “natural 
communities” whose welfare is necessary for the wellbeing of human communities. He found 
that most of these cases were retroactive approaches to immediate threats, but showed how Santa 
Monica’s ordinance functions as a precautionary principle to prevent damage in the future. The 
main issue he found was in their legal standing, considering they are merely community 
ordinances, which are superseded by State and Federal laws. In fact, the Grant and Highland 
Townships’ ordinances were contested in court by energy companies, and the court ruled in favor 
of the corporation by saying that the municipality was overstepping its authority. In response, the 
residents in both townships developed a new legal structure, the Home Rule Charter, in hopes of 
enforcing the Rights of Nature in the U.S. federal system. In summary, Kauffman and Martin 
concluded that, in the U.S., “Rights of Nature is linked to the concept of community rights and is 
                                                
36 Ibid, 15.  
37 Ibid, 15.  
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seen as a tool for communities to protect themselves against the vagaries of corporate property 
rights.”38 
IV.5 Applying Kauffman and Martin’s Argument to the Autonomy Argument 
 I believe that these cases of U.S. counties and cities establishing Rights of Nature provide 
a great deal of support for my claim that granting such rights can and will act as a tool for 
protecting individuals from exploitation by corporations and a tyrannical government. The point 
for which I’m arguing isn’t just a theoretical suggestion: as Kauffman and Martin show, it is 
building on actual examples that have already been tried in the United States. 
My own argument, however, extends beyond these examples in two ways. First, I think 
these examples show that Rights of Nature need to be implemented on a state, and eventually 
federal, level if they are to be truly enforceable. The fact that these ordinances were contested in 
court, and the communities ultimately lost, only exemplifies the nature of our government to put 
the interest of corporations and economic concerns over the well-being of its citizens, which is 
why it will be important for us promote the extension of legal personhood to Nature on a broader 
level where it will have to be enforced.  
Second, I believe these existing laws could be strengthened by emphasizing how 
extending rights to Nature protects autonomy. Were the Rights of Nature laws to be based on this 
concept of personal autonomy, it would help ensure that the individual’s protection and wishes 
were considered on an equal basis to the economic considerations. The issue now is that 
corporations are worth much more than nearly any damage they can cause. This makes it difficult 
for any individual citizen to successfully contest a corporation in court, which is why it is 
imperative we alter the argument to place focus on the encroachment of an individual’s autonomy 
rights. Thus, by extending legal personhood to Nature under the caveat of securing personal 
                                                
38 Ibid, 41.  
   43 
autonomy rights, it would grant citizens an alternate and broader route to legally contest the 
exploitative actions by corporations and the government. 
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Conclusion	
	 In	this	paper,	I	have	provided	two	legal	approaches	that	environmental	movements	may	
utilize	in	their	attempt	to	establish	environmental	protection	laws.	I	first	proposed	an	
argument	by	analogy	that	demonstrated	how	Nature	resembles	the	disabled	and	corporations	
as	non-traditional	entities	that	have	already	been	granted	distinct	forms	of	legal	personhood	in	
the	United	States.	Inasmuch	as	we	endorse	the	arguments	to	extend	personhood	to	the	
disabled	and	corporations,	we	should	also	extend	them	to	Nature.	
	 I	then	advanced	an	autonomy	argument	that	advocated	for	extending	legal	personhood	
to	Nature	as	a	way	to	further	protect	individual	autonomy.	I	supplemented	this	autonomy	
argument	with	evidence	from	regions	in	Latin	America	and	the	United	States	that	have	already	
granted	such	rights	to	Nature,	illustrating	how	and	in	what	ways	this	approach	yields	stronger	
autonomy	protection.	In	presenting	my	data,	I	was	sure	to	compare	the	cases	in	Latin	America	
and	the	United	States	within	their	cultural	context	so	as	to	demonstrate	why	the	Latin	
American	method	cannot	be	directly	applied	in	the	U.S.	due	to	differences	in	demographics	and	
political	ideology.	In	referencing	these	cases,	I	also	demonstrated	the	importance	of	
implementing	a	Rights	of	Nature	law	on	the	state	and/or	national	level	in	order	to	ensure	that	
it	is	uniformly	recognized	and	enforced.		
	 I	conclude	that	the	ideal	application	of	these	two	arguments	would	be	to	use	them	in	
concurrence	with	one	another.	The	analogy	argument	acts	as	the	foundation	for	proving	that	
Nature	meets	the	legal	requirements	for	being	considered	an	entity	deserving	of	rights,	and	the	
autonomy	argument	acts	as	the	mobilizing	force	in	gaining	support	for	the	law	by	diversifying	
the	environmentalist’s	platform	and	motives.	I	am	not	claiming	that	these	are	the	only	ways	to	
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achieve	said	goal	of	extending	rights	to	Nature	and	securing	individual	autonomy	rights.	There	
are	myriad	ways	to	approach	this	goal.			
	 Nevertheless,	I	do	believe	that	my	approach	addresses	issues	that	often	inhibit	
environmental	action:	namely,	addressing	too	small	an	audience.	In	this	thesis,	I	have	tried	to	
develop	arguments	that	can	appeal	to	everyone,	both	environmentalists	and	not,	and	unite	
them	under	a	common	goal.	I	believe	that	we	can	engage	in	actions	that	will	impact	all	current	
and	future	generations.	Though	I	believe	environmental	issues	to	be	of	the	utmost	importance,	
and	that	others	should	hold	the	same	sentiments	considering	the	dire	situation	we	now	face	in	
light	of	climate	change,	I	also	think	it	is	important	to	approach	such	issues	from	various	
perspectives	so	as	to	encourage	a	unified	coalition.	On	my	way	of	thinking,	the	broader	the	
arguments,	the	higher	the	likelihood	of	their	being	accepted	and	enacted.	After	all,	such	broad	
arguments	form	a	basis	for	unlike-minded	persons	to	find	common	ground.	Thus,	by	
approaching	environmentalism	from	a	libertarian	standpoint	that	also	supports	individual	
autonomy	rights,	my	thesis	lays	the	groundwork	for	these	two	groups	to	work	together	in	
achieving	a	common	goal.   
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